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Chapter 3
Market Structure and Challenges
for Annuities in India
Mukul G. Asher and Deepa Vasudevan
Pension systems address longevity and inflation risks in various ways. For
the most part, the richer OECD countries tend to rely on social insurance
programs to address longevity risk, and to address the inflation risk, some
countries apply price or wage indexation to pensions, while others rely on
ad hoc increases in nominal pension benefits. In India, most people do not
benefit from nor are they covered by pension (and healthcare) benefits on
a universal basis. Typically, only the armed forces, civil servants, and some
private sector employees have access to pensions. As a result, longevity and
inflation risks are mitigated only for a small proportion of the labor force.
This chapter discusses the need for robust annuity markets in India, along
with an overview of annuity products and providers. We also outline chal-
lenges facing the development of the industry in India along with reform
directions.
The rationale for robust annuity markets in India
In India, the insurance industry has divided deferred annuities into two
phases from the risk management perspective, focusing on the accumula-
tion phase and the payout phase, and there are often different providers of
these two phases. Here, we understand the annuity to be an insurance
product involving periodic payments during retirement that addresses
longevity risk (some annuity products also address inflation risk and survi-
vor risk). Annuities may be immediate at the time of retirement, deferred
so purchase takes place during the working years, or within a specified time
after retirement. Many types of annuities are normally priced on the basis
of product features as well as interest rates and other economic variables.
Terms and conditions of annuity products, particularly the level and dura-
tion of income stream, provided from a given capital sum, have equity and
adequacy implications.
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In our view, there are several reasons why India would benefit from
developing a robust annuity market. First, India is experiencing a demo-
graphic transition characterized by declining fertility rate and increasing
life expectancy. People are having fewer children but live much longer
than before, so the population is aging rapidly. Projections indicate that
the proportion of population aged 65 or older that may be classified as
retired will rise to 8 percent in 2031, and it will rise to over 13 percent by
2051. In absolute terms, the number of persons aged 65 or older will grow
from 62.5 million in 2011, to 121.8 million in 2031, and to about 229.4
million in 2051.1 There is however significant interstate variations in fertili-
ty rate; states such as Kerala and Tamil Nadu, which have below-average
fertility rates, are expected to age earlier than other states (Table 3.1).2
Both the level and the pace of aging are likely to provide significant
challenges. Life expectancy at 60 years was anticipated at 17.5 years in 2001;
by 2006, it was revised upward to 19 years.3 Longevity will rise further,
particularly for the salaried middle and upper class with access to superior
education and health facilities. Uncertainty in longevity trends is, however,
complicating the task of pricing annuities in India. This is in part because
Table 3.1 Labor force and demographic indicators in India
Demographic indicator Time
period
Value
Life expectancy at birth (years) 2009a 69.89
Male 2009a 67.46
Female 2009a 72.61
Male life expectancy at age 60 (years) 2000–5 17
Female life expectancy at age 60 (years) 2000–5 19
Total fertility rate (number of children)b 2007 2.68
Population (million) 2001 1,028
Females (million) 2001 496
Males (million) 2001 532
Sex ratio (females per thousand males) 2001 933
Population above age 60 (million) 2005 79.4
Population above age 60 (million) 2050 315.6
Total workforce (million) 2001 424.6
Urban workforce (million) 2001 97.7
Rural workforce (million) 2001 326.9
a Estimate.
b Total fertility rate is defined as the average number of live childbirths over a woman’s lifetime.
Source : Central Intelligence Agency (2009), United Nations Population Fund (2008, 2009), Office of the
Registrar General (2001).
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the combination of lower fertility and higher life expectancy creates lon-
gevity risk, or the risk that retirees will outlive their savings. Traditional
family structures addressed the problem by providing for the financial
needs of dependents through the income of earning members of the
family. Frequent mobility of labor and migration from rural to urban jobs
has broken down traditional extended families, and created nuclear family
units in which the degree of self-reliance by nuclear families in providing
for their retirement needs is expected to increase.
Another factor is that in the future, India will find it increasingly unsus-
tainable to maintain and expand its existing defined benefit (DB) pensions.
With fewer workers expected to experience lifetime (or even long-term)
employment with a single employer and pension plan sponsor, the portable
defined contribution (DC) model offering greater flexibility has become
more attractive. While precise data are unavailable, it appears that the share
of contract workers who receive lower or no pension and healthcare benefits
is rising, in both public and private sectors in India. As a result, these workers
will need to rely on their own savings to a greater extent in financing
retirement, boosting the demand for annuities. Furthermore, the civil ser-
vant DB pension schemes are economically unsustainable. Central and state
government budgets are already burdened with large fiscal deficits, and the
resources needed to address the retirement needs of vast numbers of elderly
people are likely to be too enormous to be fiscally sustainable. The need to
refocus on the goals of the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management
(FRBM) Acts by the Centre and several states may result in further expendi-
ture contraction and debt curtailment. As a result, state-financed income
support will be curtailed in the future, yet elderly retired persons will need
income support for longer periods of time.
Another consideration is that India has been projected to need to create
140 million jobs between 2005 and 2020, nearly 30 percent of the world’s
total, and most of the new jobs will be in the informal sector (ILO 2008).
Many of the informal sector workers will have some ability to save for their
retirement, thus generating a demand for annuities.4 These workers re-
quire avenues for retirement saving which generate reasonable market-
based returns and in which they have confidence.
The effectiveness of the New Pension Scheme (NPS) launched in 2004
will also require the existence of well-developed and fairly priced annuities.
NPS is a DC system of individual pension accounts jointly funded by the
employer and employee, each of whom contributes 10 percent of gross
salary. Members can select a pension fund manager and allocate funds to
an investment scheme of their choice. A key feature of the NPS is that
withdrawals are not normally permitted until the age of 60. At retirement,
accumulated balances are divided into two components: at least 40 percent
of the account balance must be mandatorily used for purchasing annuities;
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and the remainder may be withdrawn as a lump sum. Investors have the
flexibility to leave the scheme before attaining the age of 60, but in that
case they are required to annuitize 80 percent of their accumulated bal-
ance. Thus, it is expected that there should be a variety of competitively
priced annuity options to suit the retirement needs of different members.
The NPS is mandatory only for central government workers, but twenty-
three state governments have already adopted it for their employees.
Moreover, since May 2009 the NPS has been made available to any Indian
citizen who wants to subscribe to it on a voluntary basis. Therefore, the
reach of NPS is potentially very large. As membership of NPS grows,
the number of persons with requirements for annuitizing is likely to in-
crease substantially.5
Annuities are also relevant even for those who do not participate in the
NPS. Many self-employed professionals and small business owners would
find annuity products useful in managing retirement risks. In addition,
micro-pension schemes are expected to have a limited but important
function in providing retirement income, and these also need to address
payout options including annuities (Asher and Shankar 2007).
Annuity markets in India: an overview
As noted earlier, the potential demand for annuities in India is large. Next,
we show that the market for annuities is not well developed and it lacks the
depth and volume that will be necessary to efficiently administer annuities
for future retirees.
Annuities may be classified on the basis of the type and periodicity of
payouts, as well as by the additional benefits related to the annuity stream.
So in the case of an immediate annuity, payouts commence at once on
purchase; in the case of a deferred annuity, payouts start at some pre-
scribed future date. The payout may be made as a single lump sum, or
fixed periodic amounts, or variable amounts linked to an underlying index
of assets or prices. Payouts may also cease after a specified period, continue
for the duration of the annuitant’s life, or pass on to nominated survivors at
a reduced rate (see Figure 3.1).
The basic annuity product is also enhanced by adding other benefits. For
instance, inflation-indexed benefits address inflation risk by maintaining,
partially or fully, the real value of future payouts. Variable annuities offer
investors flexibility to exercise some choice over the underlying assets, in
return for riskier and non-fixed income streams. A relatively new class of
annuities has recently developed in the United States, the United King-
dom, and Australia, to cater to those with reduced life spans. Termed
‘enhanced’ annuities, they provide additional payouts to high-risk lives;
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also available are ‘impaired’ annuities which pay substantially higher
amounts to individuals with proven serious medical conditions.6 In this
way, annuities can be created across the risk spectrum, ranging from fairly
simple structures with relatively low risk to structures that expose retirees to
higher risk and provide higher incomes. Some annuity products also
combine survivor and other benefits. An annuity is thus like any other
product where design features impact on the annuity benefits which can
be purchased from a given capital sum. Therefore, price discovery for
different annuity products reflecting fair actuarial value is important.
In India, there are currently twenty-three life insurance companies, of
which twenty-two are in the private sector. The Life Insurance Corporation
of India (LIC) is the sole annuity provider in the public sector, and is the
market leader. According to the Insurance Regulatory and Development
Authority (IRDA 2010), of the 3.2 million general annuity and pension
plans in force in March 2007, about 2.9 million, or 91 percent, were written
by LIC.7 It appears that annuities constitute a relatively small segment of
the insurance sector.8 Life insurance products are likely the most impor-
tant in terms of volume as well as premiums generated, but there has been a
sharp rise in the purchase of pension policies of late. These policies are
separately classified and are not included in annuities. A disaggregation of
first-year premiums underwritten during 2007–8 suggests that annuity pro-
ducts contributed only 2.75 percent of the total premium underwritten,
whereas life insurance and pension products contributed 59.5 and 37.6
percent respectively (IRDA 2008). Pension products are relevant during
the accumulation phase, when they facilitate regular saving for the purpose
Types of 
Annuities
Frequency
of 
Premium
Type of
Payouts
Time 
Payouts 
Start 
Immediate
Nature of 
Purchaser 
No. of 
People 
Benefitting
Duration of
Payouts 
Single
Regular
Fixed
Variable Deferred 
Life 
Annuity 
Term 
Certain 
Single Life
Joint/ 
Survivor 
Annuity 
Individual
Group 
Figure 3.1 Types of annuities.
Source: Authors’ adaptation of data from Swiss RE(2007).
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 5/4/2011, SPi
36 Securing Lifelong Retirement Income
Comp. by: PG2649 Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0001242098 Date:5/4/11
Time:22:22:12 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0001242098.3D
of providing for retirement. At retirement or the vesting stage, the holder
of a pension plan has the option to purchase one of the several annuity
options.9 The rising demand for pension products therefore can potential-
ly translate into higher demand for annuities in the future (Table 3A.1)
The supply side of the market has witnessed some product innovation.
For instance, almost all insurers now offer joint life annuities which provide
survivors’ benefits,10 and increasing annuities, which are designed to at
least partially mitigate the impact of inflation on annuity streams. Deferred
plans are available to allow individuals to choose the age from which they
wish to receive annuity streams; such plans may be viewed as saving with
annuity products. Annuities that return the initial capital on the death of
the purchaser within a specified period are widely available. Each product
innovation, however, impacts on the premium for the investor; it permits a
variety of risk-management preferences to be addressed from the perspec-
tive of the consumer.11 Typically, Indian insurance companies offer an
‘open market option’ that permits investors in pension accumulation
plans to shop for the best annuity provider at the time of vesting. This
practice promotes competition and transparency in the market.
Annuity demand is typically low even in markets such as the United
Kingdom where compulsory annuitization norms have resulted in better
understanding of the benefits of annuitization.12 The observed ‘annuity
demand puzzle’ reflects a clear preference to retain some or all pension
wealth in non-annuity forms. Several reasons have been advanced in the
literature for this phenomenon. First is that annuities markets often suffer
from adverse selection, created by the tendency of those who do not expect
to live long to avoid buying annuities, thus limiting the pool to customers
with substantial longevity risk. Since individuals have private information
about their life expectancies that may not be available to the insurance
company, there is a tendency for those with higher expected life expectan-
cies to be more motivated to purchase annuities. On the supply side, the
prevalence of asymmetric information in the annuity market makes its
pricing more complex (Akerlof 1970). The outcome is that buyers often
perceive annuities as being overpriced.
Additionally, annuities are usually illiquid so annuitants forfeit the op-
tion to liquidate and exit in case of unforeseen expenditures. This inherent
inflexibility may deter retirees who desire greater control over their con-
sumption decisions. Further, unlike traditional fixed income assets, most
annuities do not return the initial principal used to purchase an annuity so
that the products do not enable individuals to leave a bequest.13 If annu-
ities are not mandatory, retirees tend to opt for higher return instruments
such as bank deposits and small saving instruments. However, if annuity
returns are made relatively attractive and its benefits are better understood,
demand may increase.
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Key challenges for India
India faces several formidable challenges in developing deep and broad
annuity markets which can address longevity and related risks in an effi-
cient, equitable, and affordable manner.
Actuarial issues
India is experiencing sustained improvement in longevity, though its speed
and extent remains uncertain.14 Given India’s heterogeneity of ethnic and
occupational groups, annuity providers face considerable challenges in
pricing different annuity products.
One problem is that life insurance companies, the only ones authorized
to provide annuities, rely on standardized mortality tables to estimate this
variable. The common industry standard is LIC’s computation of Ultimate
Mortality Rates of Annuitants (1996–8), which has increasingly become
unsuitable for the following reasons (see Table 3A.2). Yet the mortality
rates used for longevity prediction were calculated nearly a decade ago, and
hence they are not up to date. Since then, advances in health facilities,
nutrition, and overall income levels have changed, and these are certain to
have improved life expectancy at retirement. Furthermore, official mortal-
ity statistics are based on mortality patterns of occupational pensioners,
who are relatively better-off salaried individuals. They are therefore likely to
have higher life expectancies as compared to those not eligible for occupa-
tional pensions. Since annuity providers realize that price calculations
based on underestimated life expectancies would result in underpriced
annuities, they have an incentive to mark up their prices to cover the
probability that the annuitant would live considerably longer than pre-
dicted.
It is also important to note that the official life tables do not adjust for
variations in mortality across population groups such as urban and rural
dwellers, unskilled versus highly educated labor, and by sex. For instance,
women tend to live longer than men: on attaining 60 years, women have a
life expectancy of over 17 years, whereas men are expected to live for only
another 15.7 years. Applying uniform rates across persons with different
longevity risks distorts the demand for annuities. Workers with low ex-
pected longevity will be priced out of the market, thus reducing the
number of retirees who voluntarily opt for annuities. And if purchase of
annuities is mandatory, there will be a perverse transfer of resources from
low-risk (short-lived) to high-risk (long-lived) investors.
Miscalculation of longevity trends can seriously impair profits of life
insurance companies if they underestimate longevity, or provide lower
than actuarially fair annuity benefits to customers if longevity is overesti-
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Table 3A.2 Mortality tables and life expectancy calculations for India
Age
(years)
Mortality
rate
Age
(years)
Mortality
rate
Age
(years)
Mortality
rate
20 0.000919 53 0.006058 86 0.115136
21 0.000961 54 0.00673 87 0.123723
22 0.000999 55 0.007401 88 0.132652
23 0.001033 56 0.008069 89 0.141924
24 0.001063 57 0.00871 90 0.151539
25 0.00109 58 0.009397 91 0.161495
26 0.001113 59 0.01013 92 0.171794
27 0.001132 60 0.010907 93 0.182436
28 0.001147 61 0.011721 94 0.193419
29 0.001159 62 0.01175 95 0.204746
30 0.001166 63 0.01212 96 0.216414
31 0.00117 64 0.012833 97 0.228425
32 0.00117 65 0.013889 98 0.240778
33 0.001171 66 0.015286 99 0.253473
34 0.001201 67 0.017026 100 0.266511
35 0.001246 68 0.019109 101 0.279892
36 0.001308 69 0.021534 102 0.293614
37 0.001387 70 0.024301 103 0.307679
38 0.001482 71 0.02741 104 0.322087
39 0.001593 72 0.030862 105 0.336836
40 0.001721 73 0.034656 106 0.351928
41 0.001865 74 0.038793 107 0.367363
42 0.002053 75 0.043272 108 0.383139
43 0.002247 76 0.048093 109 0.399258
44 0.002418 77 0.053257 110 0.41572
45 0.002602 78 0.058763 111 0.432524
46 0.002832 79 0.064611 112 0.44967
47 0.00311 80 0.070802 113 0.467159
48 0.003438 81 0.077335 114 0.484989
49 0.003816 82 0.08421 115 0.503163
50 0.004243 83 0.091428 116 0.521678
51 0.004719 84 0.098988 117 0.540536
52 0.005386 85 0.106891 118 0.559737
Source : Institute of Actuaries of India (2010).
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mated. James and Sane (2003) provide empirical evidence on annuity
pricing policies by the (then monopoly provider) LIC which used inappro-
priate mortality tables and did not sufficiently anticipate the interest rate
declines of 2001–2. They estimate that the money’s worth ratio (MWR),
defined as the ratio of the expected discounted flow of annuity benefits
divided by initial capital invested, fell from over 1 to between 0.8 and 0.9 for
new annuity purchasers in 2002–3.
More robust and disaggregated mortality and morbidity data would
enable better price discovery in the annuities market, particularly based
on the mortality and claim experiences of LIC as well as private insurers
over a recent time period.15 Such tables, regarded in other countries as a
public good, could be made widely and easily accessible to all stakeholders,
including researchers. In such an event, MWR analysis could be regularly
conducted and publicized.
Distribution channels for annuities
The marketing and distribution of annuities, like all insurance products,
depends heavily on insurance agents. Individual agents in India procured
72 percent of the total new life business premiums in 2007–8; corporate
agents (such as banks) distributed about 11 percent; and brokers and
direct selling accounted for the remaining (IRDA 2008). Individual agents
are a critical customer interface point for the insurance industry, and they
play a key role in influencing the final purchase decision, especially for
individual life and pension policies. Therefore, they need to be trained to
disseminate knowledge about the benefits of annuities.
The present incentive structure for agents is often skewed in favor of
non-annuity insurance products. A life insurance agent earns a commission
of 2 percent of the initial amount on a single premium annuity product.
On annuities with periodic premium payments, the commissions allowed
are 7.5 percent of premiums paid in the first year and 5 percent of
premiums paid in subsequent years. By contrast, a typical whole life endow-
ment policy enables an agent to earn a premium of 25 percent of the first
year’s premium; 7.5 percent of the second and third year’s premiums paid;
and 5 percent thereafter until maturity. The large differential in commis-
sions earned increases the insurance agent’s incentive to promote non-
annuity products.
A solution to this anomaly need not lie in increasing commissions;
indeed, this would ultimately increase costs to the annuitant. Instead
what would be more efficient is the development of low-cost, technology-
intensive distribution channels. For instance, an initiative to restructure
India Post, which has a countrywide presence, would help it act as
an efficient distribution channel for a wide variety of financial products
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including annuities. Of course, this would also require the organizational
restructuring and technological upgrading of the management informa-
tion systems of this enterprise.
Establishment of other distribution channels will further develop the
market. For instance, multilevel marketing processes or internet-based
sales could be developed as additional distribution models (Pejawar
2008). The concept of ‘telcassurance,’ or selling insurance through tele-
com distribution channels, can also be adopted for the annuity product
space. In this setting, the range of possible annuity sellers would include
high-end company-owned exclusive telecom franchises, smaller telecom
stores, and neighborhood shops in rural and semi-urban areas.16 The
development of several distribution channels could help enhance annuity
penetration, improve awareness of retirement-financing instruments, and
facilitate competition.
As annuity markets grow, it may also be useful to set up a national
electronic system for comparing standardized annuity rate quotations
from different providers. India’s experience with nationwide electronic
platforms for the National Stock Exchange of India resulted in enhanced
transparency and lowering of trading costs, and this may provide a good
precedent for annuity markets. For instance, an electronic bidding system
for annuity quotes operates successfully in Chile, and it allows individuals
to make more informed choices.17
Phased or programmed withdrawals
Annuity-like products such as phased withdrawals could also be developed
by the industry. A typical phased withdrawal product involves accumulated
sums invested in an individual retirement account that are withdrawn
periodically over a number of years (typically 15–20). Unlike annuities,
under a programmed withdrawal arrangement, the funds are not trans-
ferred into a common risk pool. This option is particularly attractive to
those with relatively small balances (in the Indian context, less than INR
5 lakh capital sum in 2007 prices) and for those who do not anticipate a
long life in retirement. Phased withdrawal products could be a possible
investment option for the lump sum portion of saving accumulated under
the NPS. Phased withdrawal arrangements could also be incorporated into
the design of small saving schemes.18 Allowing phased withdrawals is feasi-
ble in Chile, where at retirement, individuals must opt either for an annuity
or a programmed (phased) withdrawal. In that case, about two-thirds of
workers chose to annuitize, and phased withdrawals are more prevalent
among workers with lower incomes and saving.19 Nevertheless, such a
phased withdrawal scheme requires careful design to ensure that the
purchasers do not outlive their retirement savings. The design would also
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need to address concerns of the tax authority that consumers do not
excessively defer withdrawal to avoid taxes.20
A multipler social security system could assist in addressing the possibility
that phased withdrawals may end even while the person requires retire-
ment support. India could strengthen social pensions and social assistance
schemes accessed by the elderly poor to address this issue. India may also
consider developing annuity products which could be repriced with differ-
ent risk-sharing mechanisms between the annuity purchasers, providers,
and the government. Additionally, reverse mortgage products that permit
retirees to access the equity in their housing may also merit consideration.
A commercial bank in India has introduced a reverse mortgage loan
annuity (RMLA) product, which combines annuity with simple reverse
mortgage and thereby addresses longevity risk. To date, however, the
response in India has been relatively limited.
Inflation risk
Annuity payouts may continue for twenty years or more after retirement,
and if they are fixed in nominal terms, inflation may lead to a steady
erosion of value. Increasing longevity compounds the cumulative impact
of even low inflation rates.21 Inflation losses are particularly damaging for
retirees because they may not be able to make up by increasing their
earnings or saving power.
Current annuity options in India only partially address such inflation
risks. For instance, SBI Life offers payouts with annual increments of 1, 2,
or 3 percent, but since inflation is usually much higher, these do not fully
hedge this risk. To date, annuity suppliers have been averse to issuing
inflation-indexed annuities because of the absence of inflation hedges in
the market. The complete absence of indexed instruments may create
incentives for annuity providers to hedge against inflation by investing in
riskier assets such as real estate, equity, or high-return derivatives; or charge
higher rates for taking on inflation risk. To develop better inflation-linked
products, it would be helpful for indexed bonds to be issued by the Reserve
Bank of India. Such bonds do, however, shift the risk of unanticipated
inflation to society at large which then manifests as contingent fiscal
liability.
Market risks
This refers to the possibility of earning lower-than-expected returns due to
adverse changes in asset prices (interest rates, exchange rates, equity
prices, real estate prices) than expected, during the term of the products.
Annuities are long-term financial instruments and are consequently subject
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to higher market risk than short duration products. In our view, the most
challenging issue for annuity underwriters is to match annuity-related
liabilities with an appropriate pool of long-term investments. In India,
however, most annuity payouts tend to be fixed and guaranteed at pur-
chase, so annuity providers invest predominantly in long-term corporate
bonds and government securities.
An adequate supply of bonds, both government and corporate, with
longer term maturities (at least fifteen years) would be necessary to address
asset–liability mismatches of annuity issuers in India.22 As the long-term
debt market is limited to infrequent issues of long-term government debt,
insurance companies that sell life annuities are substantially invested in
assets with maturities lower than their future annuity liabilities. As a result,
annuity providers are exposed to reinvestment risk, and are likely to safe-
guard their position by assigning a higher pricing to annuities.
The mandatory annuitization regulation of NPS will result in a steep
growth in demand for annuities in the future as the present cohort of
members reach retirement. As a result, disproportionate proportions
of liabilities of the life insurance companies in India would be in the
form of annuity products. To avoid asset–liability mismatch, asset portfolios
would need to be adjusted accordingly. Thus, the creation of a large pool of
long-term assets, at least partly indexed to inflation, would be critical to
sustain the growth of annuities.
It is also worth noting that the global economic crisis has increased the
market risk of annuities. In particular, the steep decline in Indian equity
markets23 has emphasized the need for insurance companies to find alter-
native investment avenues that can provide sustained returns commensu-
rate with those historically obtained from equities.
Annuitization age
Annuity returns are a function of prevailing interest rates at the time of
annuity purchase, which in turn depend on the macroeconomy. Thus, two
persons retiring at different times with the same accumulated savings may
earn different returns from the same annuity scheme interest rates. If the
purchase of annuities at the time of retirement is to be made mandatory,
then annuitants will forfeit the option to defer the purchase of annuities
until rates are favorable. This provision may significantly reduce the in-
comes available to those who retire during periods of economic downturns
and low interest rates.
So as to mitigate this risk, retirees could be permitted to hold the annuity
portion in their retirement accounts until market conditions are favorable;
and compulsorily annuitize by, say, the age of 70.24 However, retirees are
likely to need professional advice on timing the market; the Pension Fund
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Regulatory and Development Authority (PFRDA) will have to play an
important role in educating and guiding investors particularly in the
early stages of development of the annuities market.
Financial education and literacy
The need for financial education and retirement planning information for
investors as well as pension advisors, distributors, and employers is criti-
cal.25 PFRDA and IRDA, in association with employers and insurance
companies, must ensure that annuity purchasers have access to informa-
tion about the benefits and costs of different schemes and providers.
Improved financial literacy has been observed to lead to greater participa-
tion as well as higher average saving in other countries.26
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have argued that India will need to develop wider and
deeper annuity markets to more satisfactorily address longevity and other
risks during the retirement period. Rapid population aging and rising life
expectancies will lead to potentially huge demand for conventional annuity
and annuity-like products such as programmed withdrawal and conversion
of housing equity into retirement income. As the formal sector grows,
where long-term employer–employee relationships are prevalent, pension
formation will increase. Mandatory annuitization under the NPS Scheme
could boost demand for annuities. Consequently, while India’s annuity
market is currently small, it is expected to grow rapidly.
Nevertheless, there are several key challenges that must be tackled to
enhance the market’s functioning. More mortality and morbidity data on a
disaggregated basis are required to price annuity type products more
accurately and flexibly for different groups. Greater innovation in both
products and distribution channels would reduce transaction costs and
accommodate different risk preferences. If annuities are to be mandated,
it would be useful to make the age for annuitization flexible, so as to
mitigate the impact of macroeconomic cycles. And last, but surely not
least, there is a great need for better financial education and literacy so
people better understand how to save for retirement and decumulate their
assets in old age. India will be better able to address these challenges if the
number and variety of players specializing in different segments of the
insurance industry grows substantially. Further, insurance regulation
would benefit by becoming more robust and transparent, benchmarked
to best-practice international standards.
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Notes
1 The population projections cited herein were made for two different assump-
tions of the future total fertility rate (TFR). Scenario A assumes that states with
higher current TFRs would decline to the ‘replacement level’ of 2.1 children,
and Scenario B assumes that the TFR will decline to 1.85 children, close to the
levels observed in states such as Kerala. Both scenarios are consistent with the
goal of India’s National Population Policy 2000, that fertility will decline to
the point where, on an average, there are two children per family. Our chapter
relies on data for Scenario B and hence projections are more optimistic (Popu-
lation Reference Bureau 2008).
2 The Population Reference Bureau (2008) projects that the proportion of popu-
lation aged 65 or older will exceed the proportion of population under age 15 by
2041 in Kerala and by 2051 in Tamil Nadu.
3 This is based on an extrapolation of Census data.
4 A significant minority of these workers will, however, be lifetime poor and hence
will need to rely on social assistance programs whose effectiveness and viability
will depend on fiscal position as well as the efficient delivery of government
services.
5 The issue of whether NPS should contain mandatory annuitization provision is
discussed later in the chapter.
6 A detailed explanation of types of annuities and the benefits of each, as well as
factors affecting annuities, is available from the Pension Annuity Advisory Ser-
vice at http://www.pension-annuity.co.uk/
7 This data has to be interpreted carefully. When a consumer buys a pension
product, he buys an accumulation product and it is counted as ‘pension’.
When this pension product vests, there being no guarantees and with the
possibility of the annuity provider being different, it is counted as annuity.
8 Data on the number of annuities outstanding is currently not available in India.
9 Most pension plans do not require participants to annuitize the entire corpus;
instead, upon vesting, the participant has the option to withdraw part of the
proceeds as a lump sum.
10 These are vital as women as a group live longer but have lower exposure (and
remuneration) from labor market activities.
11 Table 3A.1 highlights some of the annuity products offered by a sample of
insurance companies in India.
12 The compulsory annuities market is estimated to be ten times the size of the
voluntary annuities market. The profile of a typical annuitant in the two markets
is vastly different: a purchaser of a voluntary annuity is likely to be female and
around 70 years of age whereas the average compulsory market annuity purcha-
ser would be male and around 65 years (Cannon and Tonks 2006).
13 The bequest motive has been addressed by annuities that offer that option of
returning the initial principal to a nominee. For instance, ICICI Prudential
offers an annuity plan in which the initial purchase price, or the value of the
investment corpus at the end of the accumulation phase with which the annuity
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was purchased, is returned to the annuitant’s nominee on the death of the
annuitant.
14 This tends to make life insurers price annuities conservatively. For example,
calculations based on LIC’s mortality table show that the implied life expectancy
at age 60 is about 20 years, but Census extrapolations indicate that it is 19 years
(Table 3A.2).
15 Recent reports indicate that The Mortality and Morbidity Investigating Centre,
an affiliate of the Institute of Actuaries of India (IAI) and the Life Insurance
Council, is in the process of generating new and improved mortality and mor-
bidity tables (Hindu Business Line 2009).
16 Asthana (2009) points out that telecom dealers tend to be entrepreneurs with
sound selling skills and have a fairly large prospect base of customers. In small
towns, their influence may be significant.
17 The concept of using electronic platforms to disseminate information about
annuity rates has already been adopted successfully in Chile. The sistema de
consultas y ofertas de montos de pensión or ‘SCOMP’ system allows prospective
annuity buyers to send a quote into the system through the pension fund,
insurance company, or agent. The system transmits the quote to annuity suppli-
ers, and their response is sent back to the purchaser, who can choose an annuity
offer, make a new quote, opt out of annuitization, or ask for an external quote
(see Mitchell and Ruiz 2011).
18 For instance, some senior citizens’ saving schemes could be designed with
phased withdrawals at the payout stage (Asher and Vasudevan [2008] discuss
reforms for small savers).
19 Some fear that a disproportionate share of liabilities of life insurance companies
in Chile is in the form of annuities; this would mean that their asset–liability
matching would differ considerably from that of an average life insurance
company.
20 A typical phased withdrawal design suggested by industry veterans is:
1. Divide the purchase price by the then expectation of life. This is the maximum
withdrawal that can be allowed. The minimum would be around 30 percent of
the maximum. The annuitant can withdraw within these limits.
2. In Year 2, divide the balance amount by the then expectation of life and repeat
the process outlined in Step 1.
3. This continues till the annuitant is 80/65, when conventional annuity is
purchased with balance amount.
21 Barr and Diamond (2008) point out that even with 2 percent annual inflation,
the real value of a nominal benefit after ten years is only 82 percent of its original
value, and only two-thirds after twenty years.
22 In 2008–9, the maturity profile of Central Government debt securities was
skewed toward shorter term debt. Of the total outstanding stock of government
securities, 26 percent had less than five years to maturity, 40 percent had between
five and ten years, and only 34 percent of securities had more than ten years left
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to maturity as at end-March 2009 (Reserve Bank of India 2009). This suggests
that reinvestment risk is currently significant for annuity providers.
23 The BSE Sensex lost about 55 percent of its value between January 2008 and
January 2009.
24 This is the practice in the United Kingdom where the purchase of annuities is no
longer mandated, though retirees have strong tax incentives to annuitize their
pension fund by the age of 75 years.
25 In the course of research for this chapter, it was observed that some private
insurance companies in India have well-designed websites that provide very
useful information, and knowledge available extends beyond details of schemes
on offer. Topics such as the need for and benefits of retirement planning and
features of different types of annuities are discussed, and online tools for simu-
lation of life insurance premiums and payouts are provided. Other insurance
companies might consider upgrading their web pages to facilitate consumer
knowledge in a similar manner.
26 In the United States, for instance, company-sponsored education has been
found to improve participation as well as saving.
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